Artikel
Informed-principal problems in environments with generalized private values
We show that a solution to the problem of mechanism selection by an informed principal exists in a large class of environments with “generalized private values”: the agents’ payoff functions are independent of the principal’s type. The solution is an extension of Maskin and Tirole’s (1990) strong unconstrained Pareto optimum. Our main condition for existence is that given any type profile the best possible outcome for the principal is the worst possible outcome for all agents. This condition is satisfied in most market environments. We also give an example for non-existence.
- Sprache
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Englisch
- Erschienen in
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Journal: Theoretical Economics ; ISSN: 1555-7561 ; Volume: 7 ; Year: 2012 ; Issue: 3 ; Pages: 465-488 ; New Haven, CT: The Econometric Society
- Klassifikation
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Wirtschaft
Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
Economics of Contract: Theory
- Thema
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Informed principal
mechanism design
private values
strong unconstrained Pareto optimum
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Mylovanov, Timofiy
Tröger, Thomas
- Ereignis
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Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
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The Econometric Society
- (wo)
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New Haven, CT
- (wann)
-
2012
- DOI
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doi:10.3982/TE787
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
10.03.2025, 11:46 MEZ
Datenpartner
Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
Objekttyp
- Artikel
Beteiligte
- Mylovanov, Timofiy
- Tröger, Thomas
- The Econometric Society
Entstanden
- 2012
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