Values for Environments with Externalities - The Average Approach

Arbeitspapier

We propose the “average approach,” where the worth of a coalition is a weighted average of its worth for different partitions of the players’ set, as a unifying method to extend values for characteristic function form games. Our method allows us to extend the equal division value, the equal surplus value, the consensus value, the ë-egalitarian Shapley value, and the least-square family. For each of the first three extensions, we also provide an axiomatic characterization of a particular value for partition function form games. And for each of the last two extensions, we find a family of values that satisfy the properties.

Object Details

• Language: Englisch

References and Relationships

• Bibliographic citation: Series: CESifo Working Paper ; No. 6002

Classification and Topics

• Classification: Wirtschaft ; Externalities ; Cooperative Games
• Subject: externalities ; sharing the surplus ; average approach

Contributors, Places and Time

• Event: Geistige Schöpfung
• (who): Macho-Stadler, Ines ; Pérez-Castrillo, David ; Wettstein, David
• Event: Veröffentlichung
• (who): Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)
• (where): Munich
• (when): 2016

Further information

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/145037
• Last update: 10.03.2025, 11:44 AM CET