Artikel

Collusion under different pricing schemes

We analyze collusive outcomes under different pricing schemes in a differentiated product market in which customers have elastic demand. Starting with a situation in which firms can set two‐part tariffs to price discriminate, we consider two policy interventions that ban price discrimination: Firms must set (a) linear prices or (b) fixed fees. We find that collusion at maximum prices becomes harder to sustain under linear prices. By contrast, the analysis shows that the fixed fees policy facilitates collusion at maximum prices. The results have important implications for competition policy.

Language
Englisch

Bibliographic citation
Journal: Journal of Economics & Management Strategy ; ISSN: 1530-9134 ; Volume: 29 ; Year: 2020 ; Issue: 4 ; Pages: 910-931

Classification
Wirtschaft

Event
Geistige Schöpfung
(who)
Gössl, Florian
Rasch, Alexander
Event
Veröffentlichung
(who)
Wiley
(where)
Hoboken, NJ
(when)
2020

DOI
doi:10.1111/jems.12392
Handle
Last update
10.03.2025, 11:44 AM CET

Data provider

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Object type

  • Artikel

Associated

  • Gössl, Florian
  • Rasch, Alexander
  • Wiley

Time of origin

  • 2020

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