Artikel
Collusion under different pricing schemes
We analyze collusive outcomes under different pricing schemes in a differentiated product market in which customers have elastic demand. Starting with a situation in which firms can set two‐part tariffs to price discriminate, we consider two policy interventions that ban price discrimination: Firms must set (a) linear prices or (b) fixed fees. We find that collusion at maximum prices becomes harder to sustain under linear prices. By contrast, the analysis shows that the fixed fees policy facilitates collusion at maximum prices. The results have important implications for competition policy.
- Language
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Englisch
- Bibliographic citation
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Journal: Journal of Economics & Management Strategy ; ISSN: 1530-9134 ; Volume: 29 ; Year: 2020 ; Issue: 4 ; Pages: 910-931
- Classification
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Wirtschaft
- Event
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Geistige Schöpfung
- (who)
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Gössl, Florian
Rasch, Alexander
- Event
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Veröffentlichung
- (who)
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Wiley
- (where)
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Hoboken, NJ
- (when)
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2020
- DOI
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doi:10.1111/jems.12392
- Handle
- Last update
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10.03.2025, 11:44 AM CET
Data provider
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.
Object type
- Artikel
Associated
- Gössl, Florian
- Rasch, Alexander
- Wiley
Time of origin
- 2020