A game-theoretic history of the Cuban missile crisis

Artikel

This study surveys and evaluates previous attempts to use game theory to explain the strategic dynamic of the Cuban missile crisis, including, but not limited to, explanations developed in the style of Thomas Schelling, Nigel Howard and Steven Brams. All of the explanations were judged to be either incomplete or deficient in some way. Schelling's explanation is both empirically and theoretically inconsistent with the consensus interpretation of the crisis; Howard's with the contemporary understanding of rational strategic behavior; and Brams' with the full sweep of the events that define the crisis. The broad outlines of a more general explanation that addresses all of the foundational questions associated with the crisis within the confines of a single, integrated, game-theoretic model with incomplete information are laid out.

Object Details

• Language: Englisch

References and Relationships

• Bibliographic citation: Journal: Economies ; ISSN: 2227-7099 ; Volume: 2 ; Year: 2014 ; Issue: 1 ; Pages: 20-44 ; Basel: MDPI

Classification and Topics

• Classification: Wirtschaft
• Subject: Cuban missile crisis ; game theory ; threat that leaves something to chance ; metagame theory ; theory of moves ; analytic narrative

Contributors, Places and Time

• Event: Geistige Schöpfung
• (who): Zagare, Frank C.
• Event: Veröffentlichung
• (who): MDPI
• (where): Basel
• (when): 2014

Further information

• DOI: doi:10.3390/economies2010020
• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/98471
• Last update: 10.03.2025, 11:43 AM CET