How does downstream firms' efficiency affect exclusive supply agreements?

Arbeitspapier

This study constructs a model for examining anticompetitive exclusive supply contracts that prevent an upstream supplier from selling input to a new downstream firm. With regard to the technology to transform the input produced by the supplier, as an entrant becomes increasingly efficient, its input demand can decrease, and thus, the supplier earns smaller profits when socially efficient entry is allowed. Hence, the inefficient incumbent can deter socially efficient entry via exclusive supply contracts, even in the framework of the Chicago School argument where a single seller, a single buyer, and a single entrant exist.

Object Details

• Language: Englisch

References and Relationships

• Bibliographic citation: Series: ISER Discussion Paper ; No. 878

Classification and Topics

• Classification: Wirtschaft ; Monopoly; Monopolization Strategies ; Monopolization; Horizontal Anticompetitive Practices ; Vertical Restraints; Resale Price Maintenance; Quantity Discounts
• Subject: Antitrust policy ; Entry deterrence ; Exclusive supply contracts ; Transformational technology ; Markteintritt ; Wettbewerbspolitik ; Monopol ; Theorie

Contributors, Places and Time

• Event: Geistige Schöpfung
• (who): Kitamura, Hiroshi ; Matsushima, Noriaki ; Sato, Misato
• Event: Veröffentlichung
• (who): Osaka University, Institute of Social and Economic Research (ISER)
• (where): Osaka
• (when): 2013

Further information

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/92888
• Last update: 10.03.2025, 11:41 AM CET