Arbeitspapier

Conditional Corruption

We argue that the decision to bribe bureaucrats depends on the frequency of corruption within a society. We provide a behavioral model to explain this conduct: engaging in corruption results in a disutility of guilt. This implies that people observe a lower probability to be involved in corruption if on average the guilt level of others within a country is higher. We also explore whether - and to what extent - group dynamics or socialization and past experiences affect corruption. In other words, we explore theoretically and empirically whether corruption is contagious and whether conditional cooperation matters. We use the notion of ?conditional corruption? for these effects. The empirical section presents evidence using two data sets at the micro level and a large macro level international panel data set covering almost 20 years. The results indicate that the willingness to engage in corruption is influenced by the perceived activities of peers and other individuals. Moreover, the panel data set at the macro level indicates that the past level of corruption has a strong impact on the current corruption level.

Language
Englisch

Bibliographic citation
Series: CREMA Working Paper ; No. 2008-29

Classification
Wirtschaft
Illegal Behavior and the Enforcement of Law
Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
Altruism; Philanthropy; Intergenerational Transfers
Formal and Informal Sectors; Shadow Economy; Institutional Arrangements
Human Capital; Skills; Occupational Choice; Labor Productivity
Subject
corruption
contagion effect
conditional cooperation
interdependent preferences

Event
Geistige Schöpfung
(who)
Dong, Bin
Dulleck, Uwe
Torgler, Benno
Event
Veröffentlichung
(who)
Center for Research in Economics, Management and the Arts (CREMA)
(where)
Basel
(when)
2008

Handle
Last update
10.03.2025, 11:42 AM CET

Data provider

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Object type

  • Arbeitspapier

Associated

  • Dong, Bin
  • Dulleck, Uwe
  • Torgler, Benno
  • Center for Research in Economics, Management and the Arts (CREMA)

Time of origin

  • 2008

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