Arbeitspapier

The causes of corruption: evidence from China

In this study we explore in detail the causes of corruption in China using two different sets of data at the regional level (provinces and cities). We observe that regions with more anti-corruption efforts, histories of British rule, higher openness, more access to media and relatively higher wages of government employees are markedly less corrupt; while social heterogeneity, regulation, abundance of resource and state-owned enterprises substantially breed regional corruption. Moreover, fiscal decentralization is discovered to depress corruption significantly, while administrative decentralization fosters local corruption. We also find that there is currently a positive relationship between corruption and economic development in China that is mainly driven by the transition to a market economy.

Language
Englisch

Bibliographic citation
Series: Nota di Lavoro ; No. 2010,72

Classification
Wirtschaft
Bureaucracy; Administrative Processes in Public Organizations; Corruption
Structure, Scope, and Performance of Government
Illegal Behavior and the Enforcement of Law
Subject
Corruption
China
Government
Decentralization
Deterrence
Social Heterogeneity

Event
Geistige Schöpfung
(who)
Dong, Bin
Torgler, Benno
Event
Veröffentlichung
(who)
Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM)
(where)
Milano
(when)
2010

Handle
Last update
10.03.2025, 11:44 AM CET

Data provider

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ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.

Object type

  • Arbeitspapier

Associated

  • Dong, Bin
  • Torgler, Benno
  • Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM)

Time of origin

  • 2010

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