Emission standards vs. taxes: The case of asymmetric Cournot duopoly and uncertain control costs

Arbeitspapier

It is well known that uncertainty concerning firms' costs as well as market power of the latter have to be taken into account in order to design and choose environmental policy instruments in an optimal way. As a matter of fact, in the most actual regulation settings the policy maker has to face both of these complications simultaneously. However, hitherto environmental economic theory has restricted itself to either of them when submitting conventional policy instruments to a comparative analysis. The article at hand accounts for closing this gap by investigating the welfare effects of emission standards and taxes against the background of uncertain emission control costs and a polluting asymmetric Cournot duopoly.

Angaben zum Objekt

• Sprache: Englisch

Verweise und Beziehungen

• Erschienen in: Series: BGPE Discussion Paper ; No. 45

Klassifikation und Themen

• Klassifikation: Wirtschaft ; Externalities ; Information and Uncertainty: Other ; Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets ; Environmental Economics: Government Policy
• Thema: Asymmetric Cournot duopoly ; external diseconomies of pollution ; cost uncertainty ; emission standard ; emission tax

Beteiligte, Orts- und Zeitangaben

• Ereignis: Geistige Schöpfung
• (wer): Heuson, Clemens
• Ereignis: Veröffentlichung
• (wer): Friedrich-Alexander-Universität Erlangen-Nürnberg, Bavarian Graduate Program in Economics (BGPE)
• (wo): Nürnberg
• (wann): 2008

Weitere Informationen

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/73369
• Letzte Aktualisierung: 10.03.2025, 11:41 MEZ