Evolutionarily Stable Preferences in Contests

Arbeitspapier

We define an indirect evolutionary approach formally and apply it to (Tullock)contests. While it is known (Leininger, 2003) that the direct evolutionary approach in the form of finite population ESS (Schaffer, 1988) yields more aggressive behavior than in Nash equilibrium, it is now shown that the indirect evolutionary approach yields the same more aggressive behavior, too. This holds for any population size N, if evolution of preferences is determined by behavior in two-player contests. The evolutionarily stable preferences (ESP) of the indirect approach turn out to be negatively interdependent, thereby rationalizing the more aggressive behavior.

Object Details

• ISBN: 978-3-86788-052-7
• Language: Englisch

References and Relationships

• Bibliographic citation: Series: Ruhr Economic Papers ; No. 49

Classification and Topics

• Classification: Wirtschaft ; Game Theory and Bargaining Theory: Other ; Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
• Subject: Rent Seeking ; Wettbewerb ; Evolutionäre Spieltheorie ; Präferenztheorie ; Theorie

Contributors, Places and Time

• Event: Geistige Schöpfung
• (who): Leininger, Wolfgang
• Event: Veröffentlichung
• (who): Rheinisch-Westfälisches Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung (RWI)
• (where): Essen
• (when): 2008

Further information

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/26814
• Last update: 10.03.2025, 11:42 AM CET