Arbeitspapier

Abstention in Elections with Asymmetric Information and Diverse Preferences

We analyze a model of a two-candidate election in which voters have asymmetric information and diverse preferences. Voters may costlessly choose to either vote for one of the candidates or abstain. We demonstrate that a strictly positive fraction of the electorate will abstain and, nevertheless, elections effectively aggregate voter's private information. The model also provides an explanation for observed patterns of participation and partisanship.

Language
Englisch

Bibliographic citation
Series: Discussion Paper ; No. 1195

Classification
Wirtschaft

Event
Geistige Schöpfung
(who)
Fedderson, Timothy J.
Pesendorfer, Wolfgang
Event
Veröffentlichung
(who)
Northwestern University, Kellogg School of Management, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science
(where)
Evanston, IL
(when)
1996

Handle
Last update
10.03.2025, 11:42 AM CET

Data provider

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Object type

  • Arbeitspapier

Associated

  • Fedderson, Timothy J.
  • Pesendorfer, Wolfgang
  • Northwestern University, Kellogg School of Management, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science

Time of origin

  • 1996

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