Arbeitspapier
Abstention in Elections with Asymmetric Information and Diverse Preferences
We analyze a model of a two-candidate election in which voters have asymmetric information and diverse preferences. Voters may costlessly choose to either vote for one of the candidates or abstain. We demonstrate that a strictly positive fraction of the electorate will abstain and, nevertheless, elections effectively aggregate voter's private information. The model also provides an explanation for observed patterns of participation and partisanship.
- Language
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Englisch
- Bibliographic citation
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Series: Discussion Paper ; No. 1195
- Classification
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Wirtschaft
- Event
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Geistige Schöpfung
- (who)
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Fedderson, Timothy J.
Pesendorfer, Wolfgang
- Event
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Veröffentlichung
- (who)
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Northwestern University, Kellogg School of Management, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science
- (where)
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Evanston, IL
- (when)
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1996
- Handle
- Last update
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10.03.2025, 11:42 AM CET
Data provider
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.
Object type
- Arbeitspapier
Associated
- Fedderson, Timothy J.
- Pesendorfer, Wolfgang
- Northwestern University, Kellogg School of Management, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science
Time of origin
- 1996