Arbeitspapier
Beyond condorcet: Optimal aggregation rules using voting records
The difficulty of optimal decision making in uncertain dichotomous choice settings is that it requires information on the expertise of the decision makers (voters). This paper presents a method of optimally weighting voters even without testing them against questions with known right answers. The method is based on the realization that if we can see how voters vote on a variety of questions, it is possible to gauge their respective degrees of expertise by comparing their votes in a suitable fashion, even without knowing the right answers.
- Language
-
Englisch
- Bibliographic citation
-
Series: CESifo Working Paper ; No. 3323
- Classification
-
Wirtschaft
Analysis of Collective Decision-Making: General
- Subject
-
Abstimmungsparadoxon
Public Choice
Theorie
- Event
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (who)
-
Baharad, Eyal
Goldberger, Jacob
Koppel, Moshe
Nitzan, Shmuel
- Event
-
Veröffentlichung
- (who)
-
Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)
- (where)
-
Munich
- (when)
-
2011
- Handle
- Last update
-
10.03.2025, 11:42 AM CET
Data provider
This object is provided by:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.
Object type
- Arbeitspapier
Associated
- Baharad, Eyal
- Goldberger, Jacob
- Koppel, Moshe
- Nitzan, Shmuel
- Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)
Time of origin
- 2011
Other Objects (12)
Beyond Condorcet: Optimal aggregation rules using voting records
Voting paradoxes and group coherence : the condorcet efficiency of voting rules
Voting with interdependent values: The condorcet winner
The Condorcet set: Majority voting over interconnected propositions
Optimal Voting Rules
Linear voting rules
Linear voting rules
Which Voting Rules Elicit Informative Voting?
Robust Information Aggregation Through Voting
Deliberation and Voting Rules
Anonymity proof voting rules
A generalization of Condorcet’s Jury Theorem to weighted voting games with many small voters
Beyond Condorcet: Optimal aggregation rules using voting records
Voting paradoxes and group coherence : the condorcet efficiency of voting rules
Voting with interdependent values: The condorcet winner
The Condorcet set: Majority voting over interconnected propositions
Optimal Voting Rules
Linear voting rules
Linear voting rules
Which Voting Rules Elicit Informative Voting?
Robust Information Aggregation Through Voting
Deliberation and Voting Rules
Anonymity proof voting rules
A generalization of Condorcet’s Jury Theorem to weighted voting games with many small voters
Beyond Condorcet: Optimal aggregation rules using voting records
Voting paradoxes and group coherence : the condorcet efficiency of voting rules
Voting with interdependent values: The condorcet winner
The Condorcet set: Majority voting over interconnected propositions
Optimal Voting Rules
Linear voting rules
Linear voting rules
Which Voting Rules Elicit Informative Voting?
Robust Information Aggregation Through Voting
Deliberation and Voting Rules
Anonymity proof voting rules