Arbeitspapier

Bank runs, portfolio choice, and liquidity provision

We examine the portfolio choice of banks in a micro-funded model of runs. To insure riskaverse investors against liquidity risk, competitive banks offer demand deposits. We use global games to link the probability of a bank run to the portfolio choice. Based upon interim information about risky investment, banks liquidate investments to hold a safe asset. This partial hedge against investment risk reduces the withdrawal incentives of investors for a given deposit rate. As a result of the portfolio choice, (i) banks provide more liquidity ex ante (so banks offer a higher deposit rate), and (ii) the welfare of investors increases.

Language
Englisch

Bibliographic citation
Series: Bank of Canada Staff Working Paper ; No. 2019-37

Classification
Wirtschaft
Financial Crises
Banks; Depository Institutions; Micro Finance Institutions; Mortgages
Subject
Financial institutions
Financial stability
Wholesale funding

Event
Geistige Schöpfung
(who)
Ahnert, Toni
Elamin, Mahmoud
Event
Veröffentlichung
(who)
Bank of Canada
(where)
Ottawa
(when)
2019

DOI
doi:10.34989/swp-2019-37
Handle
Last update
10.03.2025, 11:42 AM CET

Data provider

This object is provided by:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.

Object type

  • Arbeitspapier

Associated

  • Ahnert, Toni
  • Elamin, Mahmoud
  • Bank of Canada

Time of origin

  • 2019

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