Conformity and out of equilibrium beliefs
Abstract: We analyze a model of conformity with contrasting inferences. Given a form of ‘strong inferences’, any non-conforming agent is believed to have ‘extreme preferences’ and can expect to receive low esteem. With a weaker form of inferences, a non-conforming agent could be inferred to have ‘average preferences’ and can expect a smaller fall in esteem. We find that the type of inferences need not influence whether a conformist equilibrium exists. It will, however, impact on the size of the set of conformist equilibria and thus weakening inferences acts as an equilibrium selection device
- Location
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Deutsche Nationalbibliothek Frankfurt am Main
- Extent
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Online-Ressource
- Language
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Englisch
- Notes
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Postprint
begutachtet (peer reviewed)
In: Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization ; 70 (2009) 1-2 ; 164-185
- Event
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Veröffentlichung
- (where)
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Mannheim
- (when)
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2009
- Creator
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Cartwright, Edward
- DOI
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10.1016/j.jebo.2008.11.003
- URN
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urn:nbn:de:0168-ssoar-292156
- Rights
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Open Access unbekannt; Open Access; Der Zugriff auf das Objekt ist unbeschränkt möglich.
- Last update
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25.03.2025, 1:52 PM CET
Data provider
Deutsche Nationalbibliothek. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.
Associated
- Cartwright, Edward
Time of origin
- 2009