Conformity and out of equilibrium beliefs

Abstract: We analyze a model of conformity with contrasting inferences. Given a form of ‘strong inferences’, any non-conforming agent is believed to have ‘extreme preferences’ and can expect to receive low esteem. With a weaker form of inferences, a non-conforming agent could be inferred to have ‘average preferences’ and can expect a smaller fall in esteem. We find that the type of inferences need not influence whether a conformist equilibrium exists. It will, however, impact on the size of the set of conformist equilibria and thus weakening inferences acts as an equilibrium selection device

Location
Deutsche Nationalbibliothek Frankfurt am Main
Extent
Online-Ressource
Language
Englisch
Notes
Postprint
begutachtet (peer reviewed)
In: Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization ; 70 (2009) 1-2 ; 164-185

Event
Veröffentlichung
(where)
Mannheim
(when)
2009
Creator
Cartwright, Edward

DOI
10.1016/j.jebo.2008.11.003
URN
urn:nbn:de:0168-ssoar-292156
Rights
Open Access unbekannt; Open Access; Der Zugriff auf das Objekt ist unbeschränkt möglich.
Last update
25.03.2025, 1:52 PM CET

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Associated

  • Cartwright, Edward

Time of origin

  • 2009

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