Artikel
Rationalizable partition-confirmed equilibrium
Rationalizable partition-confirmed equilibrium (RPCE) describes the steady state outcomes of rational learning in extensive-form games, when rationality is common knowledge and players observe a partition of the terminal nodes. RPCE allows players to make inferences about unobserved play by others. We discuss the implications of this using numerous examples, and discuss the relationship of RPCE to other solution concepts in the literature.
- Language
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Englisch
- Bibliographic citation
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Journal: Theoretical Economics ; ISSN: 1555-7561 ; Volume: 10 ; Year: 2015 ; Issue: 3 ; Pages: 775-806 ; New Haven, CT: The Econometric Society
- Classification
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Wirtschaft
Noncooperative Games
- Subject
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Rationalizablity
common knowledge
extensive-form games
self-confirming equilibrium
- Event
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Geistige Schöpfung
- (who)
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Kamada, Yuichiro
Fudenberg, Drew
- Event
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Veröffentlichung
- (who)
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The Econometric Society
- (where)
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New Haven, CT
- (when)
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2015
- DOI
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doi:10.3982/TE1362
- Handle
- Last update
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10.03.2025, 11:44 AM CET
Data provider
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.
Object type
- Artikel
Associated
- Kamada, Yuichiro
- Fudenberg, Drew
- The Econometric Society
Time of origin
- 2015