Artikel

Rationalizable partition-confirmed equilibrium

Rationalizable partition-confirmed equilibrium (RPCE) describes the steady state outcomes of rational learning in extensive-form games, when rationality is common knowledge and players observe a partition of the terminal nodes. RPCE allows players to make inferences about unobserved play by others. We discuss the implications of this using numerous examples, and discuss the relationship of RPCE to other solution concepts in the literature.

Language
Englisch

Bibliographic citation
Journal: Theoretical Economics ; ISSN: 1555-7561 ; Volume: 10 ; Year: 2015 ; Issue: 3 ; Pages: 775-806 ; New Haven, CT: The Econometric Society

Classification
Wirtschaft
Noncooperative Games
Subject
Rationalizablity
common knowledge
extensive-form games
self-confirming equilibrium

Event
Geistige Schöpfung
(who)
Kamada, Yuichiro
Fudenberg, Drew
Event
Veröffentlichung
(who)
The Econometric Society
(where)
New Haven, CT
(when)
2015

DOI
doi:10.3982/TE1362
Handle
Last update
10.03.2025, 11:44 AM CET

Data provider

This object is provided by:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.

Object type

  • Artikel

Associated

  • Kamada, Yuichiro
  • Fudenberg, Drew
  • The Econometric Society

Time of origin

  • 2015

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