Arbeitspapier

Endogenous Entry in Markets with Unobserved Quality

In markets for experience or credence goods adverse selection can drive out higher quality products and services. This negative implication of asymmetric information about product quality for trading and welfare, poses the question of how such markets first originate. We consider a market in which sellers make observable investment decisions to enter a market in which each seller's quality becomes private information. Entry has the tendency to lower prices, which may lead to adverse selection. The implied price collapse limits the amount of entry so that high prices are sustained in equilibrium, which results in above normal profits. The analysis suggests that rather than observing the canonical market collapse, markets with asymmetric information about product quality may instead be characterized by above normal profits even in markets with low measures of concentration and less entry than would be expected.

Language
Englisch

Bibliographic citation
Series: EAG Discussion Paper ; No. EAG 12-6

Classification
Wirtschaft
Subject
adverse selection
asymmetric information
quality
experience goods
cre- dence goods
entry
entry barriers

Event
Geistige Schöpfung
(who)
Creane, Anthony
Jeitschko, Thomas D.
Event
Veröffentlichung
(who)
U.S. Department of Justice, Antitrust Division, Economic Analysis Group (EAG)
(where)
Washington, DC
(when)
2012

Handle
Last update
10.03.2025, 11:42 AM CET

Data provider

This object is provided by:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.

Object type

  • Arbeitspapier

Associated

  • Creane, Anthony
  • Jeitschko, Thomas D.
  • U.S. Department of Justice, Antitrust Division, Economic Analysis Group (EAG)

Time of origin

  • 2012

Other Objects (12)