Artikel
On the impact of independence of irrelevant alternatives: The case of two-person NTU games
On several classes of n-person NTU games that have at least one Shapley NTU value, Aumann characterized this solution by six axioms: Non-emptiness, efficiency, unanimity, scale covariance, conditional additivity, and independence of irrelevant alternatives (IIA). Each of the first five axioms is logically independent of the remaining axioms, and the logical independence of IIA is an open problem. We show that for n = 2 the first five axioms already characterize the Shapley NTU value, provided that the class of games is not further restricted. Moreover, we present an example of a solution that satisfies the first five axioms and violates IIA for two-person NTU games (N, V ) with uniformly p-smooth V(N).
- Language
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Englisch
- Bibliographic citation
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Journal: SERIEs - Journal of the Spanish Economic Association ; ISSN: 1869-4195 ; Volume: 3 ; Year: 2012 ; Issue: 1/2 ; Pages: 143-156 ; Heidelberg: Springer
- Classification
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Wirtschaft
Cooperative Games
- Subject
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NTU game
Shapley NTU value
positive smoothness
Non-transferable Utility Games
Shapley-Wert
Kooperatives Spiel
Theorie
- Event
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Geistige Schöpfung
- (who)
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Peleg, Bezalel
Sudhölter, Peter
Zarzuelo, José M.
- Event
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Veröffentlichung
- (who)
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Springer
- (where)
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Heidelberg
- (when)
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2012
- DOI
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doi:10.1007/s13209-011-0043-x
- Handle
- Last update
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10.03.2025, 11:43 AM CET
Data provider
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Object type
- Artikel
Associated
- Peleg, Bezalel
- Sudhölter, Peter
- Zarzuelo, José M.
- Springer
Time of origin
- 2012