Artikel

On the impact of independence of irrelevant alternatives: The case of two-person NTU games

On several classes of n-person NTU games that have at least one Shapley NTU value, Aumann characterized this solution by six axioms: Non-emptiness, efficiency, unanimity, scale covariance, conditional additivity, and independence of irrelevant alternatives (IIA). Each of the first five axioms is logically independent of the remaining axioms, and the logical independence of IIA is an open problem. We show that for n = 2 the first five axioms already characterize the Shapley NTU value, provided that the class of games is not further restricted. Moreover, we present an example of a solution that satisfies the first five axioms and violates IIA for two-person NTU games (N, V ) with uniformly p-smooth V(N).

Language
Englisch

Bibliographic citation
Journal: SERIEs - Journal of the Spanish Economic Association ; ISSN: 1869-4195 ; Volume: 3 ; Year: 2012 ; Issue: 1/2 ; Pages: 143-156 ; Heidelberg: Springer

Classification
Wirtschaft
Cooperative Games
Subject
NTU game
Shapley NTU value
positive smoothness
Non-transferable Utility Games
Shapley-Wert
Kooperatives Spiel
Theorie

Event
Geistige Schöpfung
(who)
Peleg, Bezalel
Sudhölter, Peter
Zarzuelo, José M.
Event
Veröffentlichung
(who)
Springer
(where)
Heidelberg
(when)
2012

DOI
doi:10.1007/s13209-011-0043-x
Handle
Last update
10.03.2025, 11:43 AM CET

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Object type

  • Artikel

Associated

  • Peleg, Bezalel
  • Sudhölter, Peter
  • Zarzuelo, José M.
  • Springer

Time of origin

  • 2012

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