Artikel

On the impact of independence of irrelevant alternatives: The case of two-person NTU games

On several classes of n-person NTU games that have at least one Shapley NTU value, Aumann characterized this solution by six axioms: Non-emptiness, efficiency, unanimity, scale covariance, conditional additivity, and independence of irrelevant alternatives (IIA). Each of the first five axioms is logically independent of the remaining axioms, and the logical independence of IIA is an open problem. We show that for n = 2 the first five axioms already characterize the Shapley NTU value, provided that the class of games is not further restricted. Moreover, we present an example of a solution that satisfies the first five axioms and violates IIA for two-person NTU games (N, V ) with uniformly p-smooth V(N).

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Journal: SERIEs - Journal of the Spanish Economic Association ; ISSN: 1869-4195 ; Volume: 3 ; Year: 2012 ; Issue: 1/2 ; Pages: 143-156 ; Heidelberg: Springer

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Cooperative Games
Thema
NTU game
Shapley NTU value
positive smoothness
Non-transferable Utility Games
Shapley-Wert
Kooperatives Spiel
Theorie

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Peleg, Bezalel
Sudhölter, Peter
Zarzuelo, José M.
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
Springer
(wo)
Heidelberg
(wann)
2012

DOI
doi:10.1007/s13209-011-0043-x
Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:43 MEZ

Datenpartner

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Objekttyp

  • Artikel

Beteiligte

  • Peleg, Bezalel
  • Sudhölter, Peter
  • Zarzuelo, José M.
  • Springer

Entstanden

  • 2012

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