Arbeitspapier

Competition in the post-trade markets: A network economic analysis of the securities business

In order to analyse the role of competition in the post-trade markets a normative network economic analysis of the securities business is provided. The theory of monopolistic bottlenecks constitutes the theoretical reference point for this analysis in order to identify stable network specific market power. It is shown that clearing and settlement are competitive value-added telecommunications services and therefore do not justify ex ante market power regulation. Precondition for competition on the markets for clearing and settlement is nondiscriminatory access to the complementary technical regulatory function - the notary function (authenticity, registry, links between competing end custodians).

Language
Englisch

Bibliographic citation
Series: Diskussionsbeitrag ; No. 101 [rev.]

Classification
Wirtschaft

Event
Geistige Schöpfung
(who)
Knieps, Günter
Event
Veröffentlichung
(who)
Albert-Ludwigs-Universität Freiburg, Institut für Verkehrswissenschaft und Regionalpolitik
(where)
Freiburg i. Br.
(when)
2005

Handle
Last update
10.03.2025, 11:43 AM CET

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Object type

  • Arbeitspapier

Associated

  • Knieps, Günter
  • Albert-Ludwigs-Universität Freiburg, Institut für Verkehrswissenschaft und Regionalpolitik

Time of origin

  • 2005

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