Artikel
Aggregation with a non-convex labor supply decision, unobservable effort, and incentive ("fair") wages
The purpose of this note is to explore the problem of a non-convex labor supply decision in an economy with unobservable effort and incentive ("fair") wages a la Danthine and Kurmann (2004), and explicitly perform the aggregation presented there without a formal proof, and thus provide - starting from micro-foundations - the derivation of the expected utility function used for the aggregate household. We show how lotteries as in Rogerson (1988) can be used to convexify consumption sets, and aggregate over individual preferences. With a discrete labor supply decisions, the elasticity of aggregate labor supply becomes a function of effort.
- Language
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Englisch
- Bibliographic citation
-
Journal: Theoretical and Practical Research in Economic Fields ; ISSN: 2068-7710 ; Volume: 9 ; Year: 2018 ; Issue: 2(18) ; Pages: 144-147 ; Craiova: ASERS
- Classification
-
Wirtschaft
Time Allocation and Labor Supply
Labor Contracts
- Subject
-
Aggregation
Indivisible labor
Unobservable effort
Fair wages
Non-convexities
- Event
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Geistige Schöpfung
- (who)
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Vasilev, Aleksandar
- Event
-
Veröffentlichung
- (who)
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ASERS
ZBW – Leibniz Information Centre for Economics
- (where)
-
Craiova
- (when)
-
2018
- Handle
- Last update
-
10.03.2025, 11:42 AM CET
Data provider
This object is provided by:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.
Object type
- Artikel
Associated
- Vasilev, Aleksandar
- ASERS
- ZBW – Leibniz Information Centre for Economics
Time of origin
- 2018
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