Preprint
Aggregation with non-convex labor supply, unobservable effort, and efficiency wages of the no-shirking type
The purpose of this note is to explore the problem of non-convex labor supply decision in an economy with imperfect observability of work e ffort, and the need to use e fficiency wages to prevent shirking as in Shapiro and Stiglitz (1984). In addition, the paper and explicitly performs the aggregation presented in Vasilev (2017) without a formal proof, and thus provide - starting from micro-foundations - the derivation of the expected utility functions used for the aggregate household. We show how lotteries as in Rogerson (1988) can be used to convexify consumption sets, and aggregate over individual preferences. With a discrete labor supply decisions, the elasticity of aggregate labor supply increases from unity to infinity.
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
Time Allocation and Labor Supply
Labor Contracts
- Thema
-
Aggregation
Indivisible Labor
non-convexities
shirking
efficiency wages
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Vasilev, Aleksandar
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
-
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften, Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft
- (wo)
-
Kiel und Hamburg
- (wann)
-
2017
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
10.03.2025, 11:45 MEZ
Datenpartner
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
Objekttyp
- Preprint
Beteiligte
- Vasilev, Aleksandar
- ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften, Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft
Entstanden
- 2017