Arbeitspapier
Insurance-markets Equilibrium with a Non-convex Labor Supply decision, Unobservable Effort, and Efficiency Wages of the "No-shirking" Type
The purpose of this paper is to describe the lottery- and insurance-market equilibrium in an economy with non-convex labor supply decision, unobservable effort, and efficiency wages of the no-shirking type a la Shapiro and Stiglitz (1984). The presence of indivisible labor creates a market incompleteness, which requires that an insurance market for (un)employment be put in operation to "complete" the market.
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
Time Allocation and Labor Supply
Labor Contracts
- Thema
-
indivisible labor
lotteries
unobservable effort
insurance
no-shirking efficiency wages
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Vasilev, Aleksandar
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
-
ZBW – Leibniz Information Centre for Economics
- (wo)
-
Kiel, Hamburg
- (wann)
-
2018
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
10.03.2025, 11:41 MEZ
Datenpartner
Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Vasilev, Aleksandar
- ZBW – Leibniz Information Centre for Economics
Entstanden
- 2018
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