On the profitability of collusion in location games
Abstract: "In this note we take a first step towards the analysis of collusion in markets with spatial competition, focusing on the case of pure location choices. We find that collusion can only be profitable if a coalition contains more than half of all players. This result holds for location games played in k-dimensional Euclidean space as long as consumers are distributed via atomless density functions. For competition on the unit interval, unit circle, and unit square we also derive sufficient conditions for collusion to be profitable." (author's abstract)
- Alternative title
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Zur Profitabilität von Kollusion in Standortspielen
- Location
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Deutsche Nationalbibliothek Frankfurt am Main
- Extent
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Online-Ressource, 12 S.
- Language
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Englisch
- Notes
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Veröffentlichungsversion
- Bibliographic citation
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Discussion Papers / Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin für Sozialforschung, Forschungsschwerpunkt Markt und politische Ökonomie ; Bd. 02-22
- Keyword
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Räumliche Konkurrenz
Standorttheorie
Wettbewerbsbeschränkung
Koalitionstheorie
Spieltheorie
Theorie
- Event
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Veröffentlichung
- (where)
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Berlin
- (when)
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2002
- Creator
- Contributor
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Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin für Sozialforschung gGmbH
- URN
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urn:nbn:de:0168-ssoar-113168
- Rights
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Open Access unbekannt; Open Access; Der Zugriff auf das Objekt ist unbeschränkt möglich.
- Last update
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15.08.2025, 7:27 AM CEST
Data provider
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Deutsche Nationalbibliothek. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.
Associated
- Huck, Steffen
- Knoblauch, Vicky
- Müller, Wieland
- Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin für Sozialforschung gGmbH
Time of origin
- 2002
Other Objects (12)
On the profitability of collusion in location games
On the profitability of collusion in location games
On the profitability of collusion in location games
On the Profitability of Collusion in LocationGames
Cooperative facility location games
Three essays on collusion
Efficiency and Collusion Neutrality of Solutions for Cooperative TU-Games
Suspecting Collusion
Detecting collusion
Private Observation, Tacit Collusion and Collusion with Communication
The Missing Equilibria in Hotelling's Location Game
Farsighted stable sets in hotelling's location games
On the profitability of collusion in location games
On the profitability of collusion in location games
On the profitability of collusion in location games
On the Profitability of Collusion in LocationGames
Cooperative facility location games
Three essays on collusion
Efficiency and Collusion Neutrality of Solutions for Cooperative TU-Games
Suspecting Collusion
Detecting collusion
Private Observation, Tacit Collusion and Collusion with Communication
The Missing Equilibria in Hotelling's Location Game
Farsighted stable sets in hotelling's location games
On the profitability of collusion in location games
On the profitability of collusion in location games
On the profitability of collusion in location games
On the Profitability of Collusion in LocationGames
Cooperative facility location games
Three essays on collusion
Efficiency and Collusion Neutrality of Solutions for Cooperative TU-Games
Suspecting Collusion
Detecting collusion
Private Observation, Tacit Collusion and Collusion with Communication
The Missing Equilibria in Hotelling's Location Game