Against Foundationalism about Persistence-Conditions

Abstract: In this paper I will argue against a view that I call foundationalism about persistence-conditions.The core of this view is that composite physical objects have their specific persistence-conditions in virtue of these conditions being fulfilled by the object's physical constituents at various times. I will provide two arguments - the argument from the possibility of instantaneous objects and the argument from the presence of persistence-conditions - which show that this view is untenable. These arguments will also point towards a more adequate understanding of what it means for an object to have certain persistence-conditions. I will expound this understanding and suggest, on its basis, an unorthodox, hylomorphist account of the persistence-conditions of objects

Object Details

• Location: Deutsche Nationalbibliothek Frankfurt am Main
• Extent: Online-Ressource
• Language: Englisch

References and Relationships

• Bibliographic citation: Against Foundationalism about Persistence-Conditions ; volume:32 ; number:1 ; year:2018 ; pages:1-26 ; extent:26 ; Kriterion ; 32, Heft 1 (2018), 1-26 (gesamt 26)

Contributors, Places and Time

• Creator: Franken, Dirk

Further information

• DOI: 10.1515/krt-2018-320102
• URN: urn:nbn:de:101:1-2022090315072054556809
• Rights: Open Access; Der Zugriff auf das Objekt ist unbeschränkt möglich.
• Last update: 15.08.2025, 7:32 AM CEST