Arbeitspapier
Fiscal Decentralization, Redistribution and Growth
This paper analyzes the welfare implications of a transfer mechanism in a fiscally decentralized economy where local governments select their tax collection effort to maximize their lifetime utility. We consider a transfer rule that both punishes for the lack of efficiency in tax-collection and compensates for the deviation of pre-tax or transfer income from a target level; in addition, a portion of transfers is considered to be directed towards investment. Simulations of the model's optimal solution reveal that increasing punishment always results in increased steady state effort, despite the disincentives that increasing income compensation or directed investment may generate. Increasing punishment also improves capital accumulation the lower the rate of directed investments and the lower the tax rate. Further, efficiency in tax collection is achieved the lower the rate of directed investment and the higher the punishment rate.
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
-
Series: Working Paper ; No. 1114
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
Fiscal Policy
State and Local Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue
Fiscal and Monetary Policy in Development
- Thema
-
Fiscal decentralization
redistribution
Besteuerungsverfahren
Dezentralisierung
Länderfinanzausgleich
Verteilungswirkung
Dynamische Wirtschaftstheorie
Theorie
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Neyapti, Bilin
Bulut-Cevik, Zeynep Burcu
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
-
Koç University-TÜSİAD Economic Research Forum (ERF)
- (wo)
-
Istanbul
- (wann)
-
2011
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
10.03.2025, 11:44 MEZ
Datenpartner
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Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Neyapti, Bilin
- Bulut-Cevik, Zeynep Burcu
- Koç University-TÜSİAD Economic Research Forum (ERF)
Entstanden
- 2011