Arbeitspapier

Fiscal Federalism, Decentralization and Economic Growth: Survey and Meta-Analysis

The theoretical literature on the economics of fiscal federalism has identified several potential effects of government decentralization on economic growth. Much of the traditional literature focuses on the efficiency aspects of a decentralized provision of public services. However, decentralization may also increase growth by raising the ability of the political system to innovate and carry out reforms. On the contrary, some authors argue that decentralization increases corruption and government inefficiency. After a discussion of the theoretical arguments, we provide both a traditional survey and a meta-analysis of the empirical literature on decentralization and economic growth. Based on our survey, we identify open questions and discuss possible ways of answering them.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: CESifo Working Paper ; No. 4985

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Methodological Issues: General
Institutions and the Macroeconomy
Structure, Scope, and Performance of Government
Intergovernmental Relations; Federalism; Secession
Institutions and Growth
Thema
fiscal federalism
fiscal competition
economic growth
meta-analysis

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Baskaran, Thushyanthan
Feld, Lars P.
Schnellenbach, Jan
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)
(wo)
Munich
(wann)
2014

Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:42 MEZ

Datenpartner

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Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • Baskaran, Thushyanthan
  • Feld, Lars P.
  • Schnellenbach, Jan
  • Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)

Entstanden

  • 2014

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