Partial Fiscal Decentralization and Sub-National Government Fiscal Discipline: Empirical Evidence from OECD Countries

Arbeitspapier

Recent theoretical research suggests that financing sub-national governments’ expenditure out of own revenue sources is linked to more responsible budgeting, because the financial implications of spending decisions then are internalized within a jurisdiction. We test this proposition empirically on a sample of 23 OECD countries over the 1975-2000 period, and find evidence in line with the hypothesis that greater revenue decentralization (measured as sub-national governments’ share of own source tax revenues in general government tax revenue) is associated with improved sub-national government budget deficits/surpluses. This finding is cross-validated with a novel, independent dataset consisting of all 34 OECD member states from 2002 to 2008.

Angaben zum Objekt

• Sprache: Englisch

Verweise und Beziehungen

• Erschienen in: Series: CESifo Working Paper ; No. 5279

Klassifikation und Themen

• Klassifikation: Wirtschaft ; National Deficit; Surplus ; State and Local Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue ; Intergovernmental Relations; Federalism; Secession ; Policy Objectives; Policy Designs and Consistency; Policy Coordination
• Thema: fiscal federalism ; revenue autonomy ; budget deficits

Beteiligte, Orts- und Zeitangaben

• Ereignis: Geistige Schöpfung
• (wer): Asatryan, Zareh ; Feld, Lars P. ; Geys, Benny
• Ereignis: Veröffentlichung
• (wer): Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)
• (wo): Munich
• (wann): 2015

Weitere Informationen

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/110780
• Letzte Aktualisierung: 10.03.2025, 11:44 MEZ