- Standort
-
Deutsche Nationalbibliothek Frankfurt am Main
- ISBN
-
9783867883610
- Umfang
-
Online-Ressource
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
- Schlagwort
-
Wettbewerb
Auktionstheorie
Glücksspiel
Einnahmen
Theorie
Wettbewerb
Auktionstheorie
Glücksspiel
Einnahmen
Erlös
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wo)
-
Essen
- (wer)
-
Rheinisch-Westfälisches Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung
- (wann)
-
2012
- Beteiligte Personen und Organisationen
- URN
-
urn:nbn:de:101:1-2012042614094
- Rechteinformation
-
Der Zugriff auf das Objekt ist unbeschränkt möglich.
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
25.03.2025, 13:51 MEZ
Datenpartner
Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
Deutsche Nationalbibliothek. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
Deutsche Nationalbibliothek. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
Beteiligte
- Franke, Jörg
- Kanzow, Christian
- Leininger, Wolfgang
- Schwartz, Alexandra
- Rheinisch-Westfälisches Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung
Entstanden
- 2012
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