Arbeitspapier

Petty Corruption and Citizen Feedback

Numerous countries are introducing citizen feedback schemes to tame corruption. We study how best to incorporate feedback in public officials’ incentives. The main novelty of our proposal is to allow citizens to directly influence officials’ pay. We consider a situation in which entrepreneurs must comply with regulation before undertaking a risky activity. Officials verify compliance to determine whether to grant permits, and may engage in either bribery or extortion. Without feedback, the government has no choice but to tolerate bribery, which leads to too many permits being granted and large negative externalities. By contrast, implementing a feedback scheme that (i) rewards entrepreneurs filing complaints and (ii) ties officials’ pay to these complaints makes deterring both bribery and extortion possible. Our proposed scheme does not require the government to be able to verify the accuracy of complaints. In an extension, we incorporate the role played by intermediaries, and show their involvement makes the feedback scheme even more valuable.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: CESifo Working Paper ; No. 5528

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Structure, Scope, and Performance of Government
Public Administration; Public Sector Accounting and Audits
Formal and Informal Sectors; Shadow Economy; Institutional Arrangements
Bureaucracy; Administrative Processes in Public Organizations; Corruption
Thema
corruption
extortion
bribery
citizen feedback
bureaucracy intermediaries

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Angelucci, Charles
Russo, Antonio
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)
(wo)
Munich
(wann)
2015

Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:46 MEZ

Datenpartner

Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.

Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • Angelucci, Charles
  • Russo, Antonio
  • Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)

Entstanden

  • 2015

Ähnliche Objekte (12)