Arbeitspapier
Procedurally Fair Implementation: The Cost of Insisting on Symmetry
We derive a necessary and a sufficient condition for Nash implementation with a procedurally fair mechanism. Our result has a nice analogue with the path-braking result of Maskin [Nash equilibrium and welfare optimality, Rev. Econ. Stud. 66 (1999) 23-38.], and therefore, it allows us to give a simple characterization of those choice rules that are implementable, but not in a procedurally fair way. This reveals the constraints that insisting on procedural fairness impose on the collective.
- Language
-
Englisch
- Bibliographic citation
-
Series: Discussion paper ; No. 108
- Classification
-
Wirtschaft
Noncooperative Games
Altruism; Philanthropy; Intergenerational Transfers
Analysis of Collective Decision-Making: General
Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations
- Subject
-
Characterization
Implementation
Nash equilibrium
Other regarding preferences
Procedural fairness
- Event
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (who)
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Ville, Korpela
- Event
-
Veröffentlichung
- (who)
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Aboa Centre for Economics (ACE)
- (where)
-
Turku
- (when)
-
2016
- Handle
- Last update
-
10.03.2025, 11:44 AM CET
Data provider
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ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.
Object type
- Arbeitspapier
Associated
- Ville, Korpela
- Aboa Centre for Economics (ACE)
Time of origin
- 2016
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