Arbeitspapier

On Globally Optimal Punishments in the Repeated Cournot Game

We challenge the global optimality of one-shot punishments in infinitely repeated games with discounting. Specifically, we show that the stick-and-carrot punishment à la Abreu (1986) may not be globally optimal. We prove our result by investigating tacit collusion in the infinite repetition of a linear Cournot game. We illustrate the existence of the stick-and-carrot globally optimal punishment for large cartels, and fully characterise it. Then, we show that for mall cartels, global optimality may be reached only with two-period punishments.

Language
Englisch

Bibliographic citation
Series: Quaderni - Working Paper DSE ; No. 1091

Classification
Wirtschaft
Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games; Repeated Games
Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets

Event
Geistige Schöpfung
(who)
Delbono, Flavio
Lambertini, Luca
Event
Veröffentlichung
(who)
Alma Mater Studiorum - Università di Bologna, Dipartimento di Scienze Economiche (DSE)
(where)
Bologna
(when)
2016

DOI
doi:10.6092/unibo/amsacta/5483
Handle
Last update
10.03.2025, 11:41 AM CET

Data provider

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Object type

  • Arbeitspapier

Associated

  • Delbono, Flavio
  • Lambertini, Luca
  • Alma Mater Studiorum - Università di Bologna, Dipartimento di Scienze Economiche (DSE)

Time of origin

  • 2016

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