Arbeitspapier
Green consumers and public policy: On socially contingent moral motivation
“Green” consumers appear to accept individual responsibility for public good provision. The propensity to take such responsibility may depend on beliefs about others’ behavior, even for consumers motivated by internalized moral norms, not by social sanctions. This can produce multiple equilibria, with either high or low demand for “green” products. Permanent increases in green consumption may be achieved through permanent or temporary taxes, or through advertising that temporarily influences beliefs about others’ behavior or about external effects. If a tax is interpreted as taking responsibility away from the individual, however, taxes can reduce the influence of moral motivation.
- Language
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Englisch
- Bibliographic citation
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Series: Memorandum ; No. 2003,31
- Classification
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Wirtschaft
Noncooperative Games
Consumer Economics: Theory
Public Goods
Renewable Resources and Conservation: General
- Subject
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Moral motivation
multiple Nash equilibria
green taxes
Konsumentenverhalten
Produktdifferenzierung
Umweltzeichen
Theorie
- Event
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Geistige Schöpfung
- (who)
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Nyborg, Karine
Howarth, Richard B.
Brekke, Kjell Arne
- Event
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Veröffentlichung
- (who)
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University of Oslo, Department of Economics
- (where)
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Oslo
- (when)
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2003
- Handle
- Last update
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10.03.2025, 11:42 AM CET
Data provider
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Object type
- Arbeitspapier
Associated
- Nyborg, Karine
- Howarth, Richard B.
- Brekke, Kjell Arne
- University of Oslo, Department of Economics
Time of origin
- 2003