Arbeitspapier
Understanding markets with socially responsible consumers
Many consumers care about climate change and other externalities associated with their purchases. We analyze the behavior and market effects of such "socially responsible consumers" in three parts. First, we develop a flexible theoretical framework to study competitive equilibria with rational consequentialist consumers. In violation of price taking, equilibrium feedback nontrivially dampens a consumer's mitigation efforts, undermining responsible behavior. This leads to a new type of market failure, where even consumers who fully "internalize the externality" overconsume externality-generating goods. At the same time, socially responsible consumers change the relative effectiveness of taxes, caps, and other policies in lowering the externality. Second, since consumer beliefs about and preferences over dampening play a crucial role in our framework, we investigate them empirically via a tailored survey. Consistent with our model, consumers are predominantly consequentialist, and on average believe in dampening. Inconsistent with our model, however, many consumers fail to anticipate dampening. Third, therefore, we analyze how such "naive" consumers modify our theoretical conclusions. Naive consumers behave more responsibly than rational consumers in a single-good economy, but may behave less responsibly in a multi-good economy with cross-market spillovers. A mix of naive and rational consumers may yield the worst outcomes.
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
-
Series: SAFE Working Paper ; No. 411
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
Microeconomic Behavior: Underlying Principles
Consumer Economics: Theory
General Equilibrium and Disequilibrium: General
Externalities
Altruism; Philanthropy; Intergenerational Transfers
Micro-Based Behavioral Economics: Role and Effects of Psychological, Emotional, Social, and Cognitive Factors on Decision Making‡
- Thema
-
socially responsible consumers
social preferences
climate change
externalities
competitive equilibrium
regulation
taxes
caps
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Kaufmann, Marc
Andre, Peter
Kîoszegi, Botond
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
-
Leibniz Institute for Financial Research SAFE
- (wo)
-
Frankfurt a. M.
- (wann)
-
2023
- DOI
-
doi:10.2139/ssrn.4671808
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
10.03.2025, 11:43 MEZ
Datenpartner
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Kaufmann, Marc
- Andre, Peter
- Kîoszegi, Botond
- Leibniz Institute for Financial Research SAFE
Entstanden
- 2023