Arbeitspapier

Targeting in adaptive networks

This paper studies optimal targeting policies, consisting of eliminating (preserving) a set of agents in a network and aimed at minimizing (maximizing) aggregate effort levels. Different from the existing literature, we allow the equilibrium network to adapt after a network intervention and consider targeting of multiple agents. A simple and tractable adjustment process is introduced. We find that allowing the network to adapt may overturn optimal targeting results for a fixed network and that congestion/competition effects are crucial to understanding differences between the two settings.

Language
Englisch

Bibliographic citation
Series: Texto para discussão ; No. 677

Classification
Wirtschaft
Externalities
Network Formation and Analysis: Theory
Subject
Targeting
key player policy
peer effects
local strategic complements
global strategic substitutes
positive externalities
negative externalities

Event
Geistige Schöpfung
(who)
Hiller, Timo
Event
Veröffentlichung
(who)
Pontifícia Universidade Católica do Rio de Janeiro (PUC-Rio), Departamento de Economia
(where)
Rio de Janeiro
(when)
2020

Handle
Last update
10.03.2025, 11:44 AM CET

Data provider

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Object type

  • Arbeitspapier

Associated

  • Hiller, Timo
  • Pontifícia Universidade Católica do Rio de Janeiro (PUC-Rio), Departamento de Economia

Time of origin

  • 2020

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