Arbeitspapier
Targeting in adaptive networks
This paper studies optimal targeting policies, consisting of eliminating (preserving) a set of agents in a network and aimed at minimizing (maximizing) aggregate effort levels. Different from the existing literature, we allow the equilibrium network to adapt after a network intervention and consider targeting of multiple agents. A simple and tractable adjustment process is introduced. We find that allowing the network to adapt may overturn optimal targeting results for a fixed network and that congestion/competition effects are crucial to understanding differences between the two settings.
- Language
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Englisch
- Bibliographic citation
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Series: Texto para discussão ; No. 677
- Classification
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Wirtschaft
Externalities
Network Formation and Analysis: Theory
- Subject
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Targeting
key player policy
peer effects
local strategic complements
global strategic substitutes
positive externalities
negative externalities
- Event
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Geistige Schöpfung
- (who)
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Hiller, Timo
- Event
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Veröffentlichung
- (who)
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Pontifícia Universidade Católica do Rio de Janeiro (PUC-Rio), Departamento de Economia
- (where)
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Rio de Janeiro
- (when)
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2020
- Handle
- Last update
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10.03.2025, 11:44 AM CET
Data provider
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.
Object type
- Arbeitspapier
Associated
- Hiller, Timo
- Pontifícia Universidade Católica do Rio de Janeiro (PUC-Rio), Departamento de Economia
Time of origin
- 2020