Arbeitspapier
Increasing resource rent taxation when the corporate income tax is reduced?
Under international tax competition, corporate income tax rates are predicted to decrease, and the tax burden will shift onto immobile factors. This case study considers tax changes that illustrate the predictions for Norway 2012-2018. Petroleum rent was taxed at high rates in 2012, and while corporate income tax rates were reduced in four steps, the marginal tax on rent was kept constant. The four steps are analyzed in light of the tax burden shift predicted by theory, and possible intentions of the government. The tax on petroleum rent has not been increased. Government intentions seem to have been shifting.
- Language
-
Englisch
- Bibliographic citation
-
Series: Memorandum ; No. 03/2018
- Classification
-
Wirtschaft
Taxation and Subsidies: Efficiency; Optimal Taxation
Business Taxes and Subsidies including sales and value-added (VAT)
International Fiscal Issues; International Public Goods
Nonrenewable Resources and Conservation: General
- Subject
-
rent taxation
tax competition
immobile factors
petroleum
Norway
- Event
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (who)
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Lund, Diderik
- Event
-
Veröffentlichung
- (who)
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University of Oslo, Department of Economics
- (where)
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Oslo
- (when)
-
2018
- Handle
- Last update
-
10.03.2025, 11:44 AM CET
Data provider
This object is provided by:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.
Object type
- Arbeitspapier
Associated
- Lund, Diderik
- University of Oslo, Department of Economics
Time of origin
- 2018
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