Experimental Investigation of a Cyclic Duopoly Game

Arbeitspapier

The notion of a cyclic game has been introduced by Selten and Wooders (2001). They illustrate the concept by the analysis of a cyclic duopoly game. The experiments reported concern this game. The game was played by eleven matching groups of six players each. The observed choice fre- quencies were compared with the predictions of Nash equilibrium, impulse balance equilibrium (Selten, Abbink and Cox (2005), Selten and Chmura (2007)) and two-sample equilbrium (Osborne and Rubinstein(1998)). Pair- wise comparisons by the Wilcoxon Signed-rank test show that impulse balance equilibrium as well as two-sample equilibrium have a significantly better predictive success than Nash equilibrium. The difference between impulse balance equilibrium and two-sample equilibrium is not significant.In each matching group three players acted only in uneven periods and the other three only in even periods. This game has two pure strategy equi- libria in which both types of players behave differently. The data exhibit a weak but significant tendency in the direction of coordination at a pure strategy equilibrium.

Object Details

• Language: Englisch

References and Relationships

• Bibliographic citation: Series: Bonn Econ Discussion Papers ; No. 9/2007

Classification and Topics

• Classification: Wirtschaft ; Design of Experiments: General ; Market Structure, Pricing, and Design: Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection ; Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games; Repeated Games
• Subject: cyclic game duopoly experiment ; impulse balance equilibrium ; two-sample equilibrium ; Dynamisches Spiel ; Duopol ; Experiment ; Gleichgewicht ; Theorie

Contributors, Places and Time

• Event: Geistige Schöpfung
• (who): Goerg, Sebastian J. ; Selten, Reinhard
• Event: Veröffentlichung
• (who): University of Bonn, Bonn Graduate School of Economics (BGSE)
• (where): Bonn
• (when): 2007

Further information

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/22984
• Last update: 10.03.2025, 11:43 AM CET