Arbeitspapier
Accounting for endogenous search behavior in matching function estimation
We show that equilibrium matching models imply that standard estimates of the matching function elasticities are exposed to an endogeneity bias, which arises from the search behavior of agents on either side of the market. We offer an estimation method which, under certain assumptions, is immune from that bias. Application of our method to the estimation of a basic version of the matching function using aggregate U.S. data from the Job Openings and Labor Turnover Survey (JOLTS) suggests that the bias is quantitatively important.
- Language
-
Englisch
- Bibliographic citation
-
Series: IZA Discussion Papers ; No. 5807
- Classification
-
Wirtschaft
Labor Turnover; Vacancies; Layoffs
Unemployment: Models, Duration, Incidence, and Job Search
- Subject
-
matching function estimation
unemployment
vacancies
job finding
- Event
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (who)
-
Borowczyk Martins, Daniel
Jolivet, Grégory
Postel-Vinay, Fabien
- Event
-
Veröffentlichung
- (who)
-
Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA)
- (where)
-
Bonn
- (when)
-
2011
- Handle
- URN
-
urn:nbn:de:101:1-20110629963
- Last update
-
10.03.2025, 11:42 AM CET
Data provider
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ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.
Object type
- Arbeitspapier
Associated
- Borowczyk Martins, Daniel
- Jolivet, Grégory
- Postel-Vinay, Fabien
- Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA)
Time of origin
- 2011
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