Arbeitspapier
Efficiency in a search and matching model with endogenous participation
We show that in a search/matching model with endogenous participation in which workers are heterogeneous with respect to market productivity, satisfying the Hosios rule leads to excessive vacancy creation. The reason is that the marginal worker does not internalize the effect of his or her participation on average productivity.
- Language
-
Englisch
- Bibliographic citation
-
Series: IZA Discussion Papers ; No. 4097
- Classification
-
Wirtschaft
- Subject
-
Search
matching
efficiency
participation
Hosios rule
Arbeitsuche
Suchtheorie
Arbeitsangebot
Arbeitsproduktivität
Offene Stellen
Arbeitsplatzsuchmodell
Theorie
- Event
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (who)
-
Albrecht, James
Navarro, Lucas
Vroman, Susan
- Event
-
Veröffentlichung
- (who)
-
Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA)
- (where)
-
Bonn
- (when)
-
2009
- Handle
- URN
-
urn:nbn:de:101:1-20090403104
- Last update
- 10.03.2025, 11:44 AM CET
Data provider
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ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.
Object type
- Arbeitspapier
Associated
- Albrecht, James
- Navarro, Lucas
- Vroman, Susan
- Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA)
Time of origin
- 2009
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