Arbeitspapier

Limiting sender's information in Bayesian persuasion

This paper studies how the outcome of Bayesian persuasion depends on a sender's information. I study a game in which, prior to the sender's information disclosure, the designer can restrict the most informative signal that the sender can generate. In the binary action case, I consider arbitrary preferences of the designer and characterize all equilibrium outcomes. As a corollary, I solve a problem of how to maximize a receiver's payoffs by restricting the sender's information: Whenever the designer can increase the receiver's payoffs by restricting the sender's information, the receiver-optimal way coincides with an equilibrium of the game in which the receiver persuades the sender.

Language
Englisch

Bibliographic citation
Series: Bank of Canada Staff Working Paper ; No. 2019-10

Classification
Wirtschaft
Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness
Subject
Economic models

Event
Geistige Schöpfung
(who)
Ichihashi, Shota
Event
Veröffentlichung
(who)
Bank of Canada
(where)
Ottawa
(when)
2019

DOI
doi:10.34989/swp-2019-10
Handle
Last update
10.03.2025, 11:43 AM CET

Data provider

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Object type

  • Arbeitspapier

Associated

  • Ichihashi, Shota
  • Bank of Canada

Time of origin

  • 2019

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