Arbeitspapier
Limiting sender's information in Bayesian persuasion
This paper studies how the outcome of Bayesian persuasion depends on a sender's information. I study a game in which, prior to the sender's information disclosure, the designer can restrict the most informative signal that the sender can generate. In the binary action case, I consider arbitrary preferences of the designer and characterize all equilibrium outcomes. As a corollary, I solve a problem of how to maximize a receiver's payoffs by restricting the sender's information: Whenever the designer can increase the receiver's payoffs by restricting the sender's information, the receiver-optimal way coincides with an equilibrium of the game in which the receiver persuades the sender.
- Language
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Englisch
- Bibliographic citation
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Series: Bank of Canada Staff Working Paper ; No. 2019-10
- Classification
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Wirtschaft
Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness
- Subject
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Economic models
- Event
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Geistige Schöpfung
- (who)
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Ichihashi, Shota
- Event
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Veröffentlichung
- (who)
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Bank of Canada
- (where)
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Ottawa
- (when)
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2019
- DOI
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doi:10.34989/swp-2019-10
- Handle
- Last update
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10.03.2025, 11:43 AM CET
Data provider
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.
Object type
- Arbeitspapier
Associated
- Ichihashi, Shota
- Bank of Canada
Time of origin
- 2019