Arbeitspapier

IMF-supported adjustment programs: Welfare implications and the catalytic effect

The author studies the welfare implications of adjustment programs supported by the International Monetary Fund (IMF). He uses a model where an endogenous borrowing constraint, set up by international lenders who will never lend more than a debt ceiling, forces the borrowing economy to always choose repayment over default. The immediate potential welfare cost of joining a program is driven by IMF conditionality: to be able to borrow from the IMF, the country has to submit to limits on the consumption of public goods. The benefits derive from the additional borrowing from the IMF (at a lower interest rate) and/or through a "catalytic effect" on private loans, which facilitates consumption smoothing over time. Simulations of the dynamic model in two institutional environments - with and without the IMF - are compared. Results indicate that when conditionality forces the country to save more, at a cost that does not prevent it from joining an IMF program, the resulting lower probability of default can induce private lenders to relax their borrowing constraints. Based on a calibration of the model for the Brazilian economy, the overall welfare gains associated with IMF programs are relatively small.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: Bank of Canada Working Paper ; No. 2007-22

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Current Account Adjustment; Short-term Capital Movements
International Monetary Arrangements and Institutions
International Lending and Debt Problems
Open Economy Macroeconomics
Thema
Internationale Wirtschaftshilfe
Internationaler Kredit
Verschuldungsrestriktion
Wohlfahrtseffekt
Wirtschaftsmodell
Brasilien

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
De Resende, Carlos
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
Bank of Canada
(wo)
Ottawa
(wann)
2007

DOI
doi:10.34989/swp-2007-22
Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:41 MEZ

Datenpartner

Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.

Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • De Resende, Carlos
  • Bank of Canada

Entstanden

  • 2007

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