Testing a Forgotten Aspect of Akerlof's Gift Exchange Hypothesis: Relational Contracts with Individual and Uniform Wages
- Standort
-
Deutsche Nationalbibliothek Frankfurt am Main
- Umfang
-
Online-Ressource
- Sprache
-
Deutsch
- Erschienen in
-
IZA Discussion Papers ; 6415
- Klassifikation
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Wirtschaft
- Schlagwort
-
Lohnbildung
Austauschtheorie (Soziologie)
Unvollständiger Vertrag
Effizienzlohn
Test
Lohnbildung
Austauschtheorie
Kontrakttheorie
Effizienzlohn
Effizienzlohntheorie
Testen
- Ereignis
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Veröffentlichung
- (wo)
-
Bonn
- (wer)
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Forschungsinstitut zur Zukunft der Arbeit GmbH
- (wann)
-
2012
- URN
-
urn:nbn:de:101:1-201206147306
- Rechteinformation
-
Der Zugriff auf das Objekt ist unbeschränkt möglich.
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
25.03.2025, 13:54 MEZ
Datenpartner
Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
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Deutsche Nationalbibliothek. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
Beteiligte
- Kocher, Martin
- Luhan, Wolfgang J.
- Sutter, Matthias
- Forschungsinstitut zur Zukunft der Arbeit GmbH
Entstanden
- 2012
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