Strategic R&D with knowledge spillovers and endogenous time to complete

Arbeitspapier

We present a model where firms make competitive decisions about the optimal duration (or time to build) of their R&D projects. Choosing its project's duration, the firm can choose to become a leader or a follower, based on its R&D efficiency, the size of the R&D to be carried out and the degree of innovation, which this research will produce. It is shown that asymmetry in R&D efficiency between firms is an important factor determining feasibility of the preemption and attrition scenarios in competitive R&D with time to build. Scenarios of attrition and preemption games are most likely to occur when competitors have similar R&D efficiencies. In case of largely asymmetric firms the games of attrition and preemption are very unlikely, thus the R&D duration choices of firms are determined by the actual trade-off between the benefits of earlier innovation and the costs of faster R&D project completion.

Angaben zum Objekt

• Sprache: Englisch

Verweise und Beziehungen

• Erschienen in: Series: CESifo Working Paper ; No. 2027

Klassifikation und Themen

• Klassifikation: Wirtschaft ; Noncooperative Games ; Firm Behavior: Theory ; Innovation and Invention: Processes and Incentives
• Thema: Industrielle Forschung ; Betriebliche Terminplanung ; Innovationswettbewerb ; Wissenstransfer ; Nichtkooperatives Spiel ; Theorie

Beteiligte, Orts- und Zeitangaben

• Ereignis: Geistige Schöpfung
• (wer): Lukach, Ruslan ; Kort, Peter M. ; Plasmans, Joseph
• Ereignis: Veröffentlichung
• (wer): Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)
• (wo): Munich
• (wann): 2007

Weitere Informationen

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/26072
• Letzte Aktualisierung: 10.03.2025, 11:42 MEZ