Arbeitspapier
Information transmission in coalitional voting games
A core allocation of a complete information economy can be characterized as one that would not be unanimously rejected in favor of another feasible alternative by any coalition. We use this test of coalitional voting in an incomplete information environment to formalize a notion of resilience. Since information transmission is implicit in the Bayesian equilibria of such voting games, this approach makes it possible to derive core concepts in which the transmission of information among members of a coalition is endogenous. Our results lend support to the credible core of Dutta and Vohra (2003) and the core proposed by Myerson (2003) as two that can be justified in terms of coalitional voting.
- Language
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Englisch
- Bibliographic citation
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Series: Working Paper ; No. 2005-01
- Classification
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Wirtschaft
Cooperative Games
Noncooperative Games
Exchange and Production Economies
Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
- Subject
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Core
Incomplete Information
Coalitional Voting
Resilience
Mediation
Core
Unvollkommene Information
Koalition
Spieltheorie
- Event
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Geistige Schöpfung
- (who)
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Serrano, Roberto
Vohra, Rajiv
- Event
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Veröffentlichung
- (who)
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Brown University, Department of Economics
- (where)
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Providence, RI
- (when)
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2005
- Handle
- Last update
-
10.03.2025, 11:44 AM CET
Data provider
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.
Object type
- Arbeitspapier
Associated
- Serrano, Roberto
- Vohra, Rajiv
- Brown University, Department of Economics
Time of origin
- 2005
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