Arbeitspapier
Incomplete-information models of large economies with anonymity: Existence and uniqueness of common priors
The paper provides a specification of belief systems for models of large economies with anonymity in which aggregate states depend only on cross-section distributions of types. For belief systems satisfying certain conditions of mutual absolute continuity, the paper gives a necessary and sufficient condition for the existence of a common prior. Under the given conditions, the common prior is unique.
- Sprache
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Englisch
- Erschienen in
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Series: Preprints of the Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods ; No. 2011,8
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
Game Theory and Bargaining Theory: General
Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness
- Thema
-
belief systems
consistency
common prior
large economy
Spieltheorie
Unvollkommene Information
Wissen
Meinung
Theorie
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Hellwig, Martin
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
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Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods
- (wo)
-
Bonn
- (wann)
-
2011
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
10.03.2025, 11:44 MEZ
Datenpartner
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Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Hellwig, Martin
- Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods
Entstanden
- 2011