Assortative matching through signals

Arbeitspapier

When agents do not know where to find a match, they search. However, agents could direct their search to agents who strategically choose a certain signal. Introducing cheap talk to a model of sequential search with bargaining, we find that signals will be truthful if there are mild complementarities in match production: supermodularity of the match production function is a necessary and sufficient condition. It simultaneously ensures perfect positive assortative matching, so that single-crossing property and sorting condition coincide. As the information from signals allows agents to avoid all unnecessary search, this search model exhibits nearly unconstrained efficiency.

Angaben zum Objekt

• Sprache: Englisch

Verweise und Beziehungen

• Erschienen in: Series: SFB 649 Discussion Paper ; No. 2013-044

Klassifikation und Themen

• Klassifikation: Wirtschaft ; Unemployment: Models, Duration, Incidence, and Job Search ; Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness ; Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
• Thema: assortative matching ; sorting ; search ; signals ; information

Beteiligte, Orts- und Zeitangaben

• Ereignis: Geistige Schöpfung
• (wer): Poeschel, Friedrich
• Ereignis: Veröffentlichung
• (wer): Humboldt University of Berlin, Collaborative Research Center 649 - Economic Risk
• (wo): Berlin
• (wann): 2013

Weitere Informationen

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/91579
• Letzte Aktualisierung: 02.03.0003, 14:42 MEZ