Arbeitspapier
Delay in joint projects
If a public project is financed through private contributions with convex costs, project completion may be delayed. The paper examines how asymmetries, the order of moves, and the absence of commitment will affect the completion time. All three factors are shown to cause delay, although for different reasons. Without commitment, individual contributions are strategic complements in the completing Markov perfect equilibrium, such that partial harmonization of strategies is beneficial for all.
- Alternative title
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Verzögerung bei gemeinsamen Projekten
- Language
-
Englisch
- Bibliographic citation
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Series: WZB Discussion Paper ; No. SP II 2003-15
- Classification
-
Wirtschaft
Public Goods
- Subject
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Delay
private provision
public project
- Event
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Geistige Schöpfung
- (who)
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Kessing, Sebastian Georg
- Event
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Veröffentlichung
- (who)
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Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin für Sozialforschung (WZB)
- (where)
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Berlin
- (when)
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2003
- Handle
- Last update
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10.03.2025, 11:44 AM CET
Data provider
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ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.
Object type
- Arbeitspapier
Associated
- Kessing, Sebastian Georg
- Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin für Sozialforschung (WZB)
Time of origin
- 2003
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