Arbeitspapier

Financing a portfolio of projects

This paper shows that investors financing a portfolio of projects may use the depth of their financial pockets to overcome entrepreneurial incentive problems. Competition for scarce informed capital at the refinancing stage strengthens investors’ bargaining positions. And yet, entrepreneurs’ incentives may be improved, because projects funded by investors with “shallow pockets” must have not only a positive net present value at the refinancing stage, but one that is higher than that of competing portfolio projects. Our paper may help to understand provisions used in venture capital finance that limit a fund’s initial capital and make it difficult to add more capital once the initial venture capital fund is raised.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: IMFS Working Paper Series ; No. 5

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Inderst, Roman
Mueller, Holger M.
Münnich, Felix
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
Goethe University Frankfurt, Institute for Monetary and Financial Stability (IMFS)
(wo)
Frankfurt a. M.
(wann)
2006

Handle
URN
urn:nbn:de:hebis:30-70350
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:42 MEZ

Datenpartner

Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
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Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • Inderst, Roman
  • Mueller, Holger M.
  • Münnich, Felix
  • Goethe University Frankfurt, Institute for Monetary and Financial Stability (IMFS)

Entstanden

  • 2006

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