Arbeitspapier

Financing a portfolio of projects

This paper shows that investors financing a portfolio of projects may use the depth of their financial pockets to overcome entrepreneurial incentive problems. Competition for scarce informed capital at the refinancing stage strengthens investors’ bargaining positions. And yet, entrepreneurs’ incentives may be improved, because projects funded by investors with “shallow pockets” must have not only a positive net present value at the refinancing stage, but one that is higher than that of competing portfolio projects. Our paper may help to understand provisions used in venture capital finance that limit a fund’s initial capital and make it difficult to add more capital once the initial venture capital fund is raised.

Language
Englisch

Bibliographic citation
Series: IMFS Working Paper Series ; No. 5

Classification
Wirtschaft

Event
Geistige Schöpfung
(who)
Inderst, Roman
Mueller, Holger M.
Münnich, Felix
Event
Veröffentlichung
(who)
Goethe University Frankfurt, Institute for Monetary and Financial Stability (IMFS)
(where)
Frankfurt a. M.
(when)
2006

Handle
URN
urn:nbn:de:hebis:30-70350
Last update
10.03.2025, 11:42 AM CET

Data provider

This object is provided by:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.

Object type

  • Arbeitspapier

Associated

  • Inderst, Roman
  • Mueller, Holger M.
  • Münnich, Felix
  • Goethe University Frankfurt, Institute for Monetary and Financial Stability (IMFS)

Time of origin

  • 2006

Other Objects (12)