Procrastination and projects

Arbeitspapier

In this paper I analyze a dynamic moral hazard problem in teams with imperfect monitoring in continuous time. In the model, players are working together to achieve a breakthrough in a project while facing a deadline. The effort needed to achieve such a breakthrough is unknown but players have a common prior about its distribution. Each player is only able to observe their own effort, not the effort of others. I characterize the optimal effort path for general distributions of breakthrough efforts and show that, in addition to free-riding, procrastination arises. Furthermore, in this model, procrastination is not a result of irrational behavior and is even present in the welfare-maximizing solution.

Angaben zum Objekt

• Sprache: Englisch

Verweise und Beziehungen

• Erschienen in: Series: Center for Mathematical Economics Working Papers ; No. 544

Klassifikation und Themen

• Klassifikation: Wirtschaft ; Noncooperative Games ; Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games; Repeated Games ; Criteria for Decision-Making under Risk and Uncertainty ; Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design ; Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness ; Public Goods
• Thema: Procrastination ; Moral hazard in teams ; Public good provision

Beteiligte, Orts- und Zeitangaben

• Ereignis: Geistige Schöpfung
• (wer): Külpmann, Philipp
• Ereignis: Veröffentlichung
• (wer): Bielefeld University, Center for Mathematical Economics (IMW)
• (wo): Bielefeld
• (wann): 2015

Weitere Informationen

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/121347
• URN: urn:nbn:de:0070-pub-27647303
• Letzte Aktualisierung: 10.03.2025, 11:42 MEZ