Arbeitspapier

Consumer Surplus as the Appropriate Standard for Antitrust Enforcement

In antitrust enforcement as in cost-benefit analysis, neoclassical economics may be interpreted as arguing for the use of a "total welfare" standard whose implementation treats transfers as welfare-neutral. Several recent papers call for antitrust agencies to move in the direction of this version of a total welfare standard for enforcement. However, as Williamson (1968) noted, horizontal mergers typically result in transfers that may greatly exceed in magnitude any deadweight loss or efficiency gain, so that a decision to ignore transfers may be quite important. I argue that such transfers are likely overall to be quite regressive, and thus that a consumer surplus standard rather than a total welfare standard may be appropriate for antitrust. Two common arguments against this standard – that most mergers are in markets for intermediate goods, and that a consumer welfare standard implies a tolerance for monopsony – are examined and found wanting. I argue in addition that, even if a total welfare standard is used, both the finance literature on merger outcomes and the structure of the U.S. enforcement agencies suggest that the use of a consumer surplus standard by the agencies is more likely to achieve that goal.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: EAG Discussion Paper ; No. EAG 07-9

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Institutions: Design, Formation, Operations, and Impact
Personal Income, Wealth, and Their Distributions
Mergers; Acquisitions; Restructuring; Voting; Proxy Contests; Corporate Governance
Antitrust Law
Antitrust Issues and Policies: General

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Pittman, Russell
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
U.S. Department of Justice, Antitrust Division, Economic Analysis Group (EAG)
(wo)
Washington, DC
(wann)
2007

Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:42 MEZ

Datenpartner

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Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • Pittman, Russell
  • U.S. Department of Justice, Antitrust Division, Economic Analysis Group (EAG)

Entstanden

  • 2007

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