Arbeitspapier
Coordinating under incomplete information
We show that, in a minimum effort game with incomplete information where player types are independently drawn, there is a largest and smallest Bayesian equilibrium, leading to the set of equilibrium payoffs (as evaluated at the interim stage) having a lattice structure. Furthermore, the range of equilibrium payoffs converges to those of the deterministic complete information version of the game, in the limit as the incomplete information vanishes. This entails that such incomplete information alone cannot explain the equilibrium selection suggested by experimental evidence.
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
-
Series: Memorandum ; No. 2007,22
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
Noncooperative Games
- Thema
-
Minimum effort games
Coordination games
Incomplete information
Nichtkooperatives Spiel
Koordination
Unvollkommene Information
Theorie
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Asheim, Geir B.
Yoo, Seung Han
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
-
University of Oslo, Department of Economics
- (wo)
-
Oslo
- (wann)
-
2007
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
10.03.2025, 11:42 MEZ
Datenpartner
Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Asheim, Geir B.
- Yoo, Seung Han
- University of Oslo, Department of Economics
Entstanden
- 2007
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