Arbeitspapier

Insurance-markets Equilibrium with a Non-convex Labor Supply decision, Unobservable Effort, and Incentive ("Fair") Wages

The purpose of this note is to describe the lottery- and insurance-market equilibrium in an economy with non-convex labor supply decision, unobservable effort, and incentive ("fair") wages. The presence of indivisible labor creates a market incompleteness, which requires that an insurance market for employment be put in operation to "complete" the market.

Language
Englisch

Classification
Wirtschaft
Time Allocation and Labor Supply
Subject
Indivisible labor
Lotteries
Insurance
Unobservable effort
fair wages

Event
Geistige Schöpfung
(who)
Vasilev, Aleksandar
Event
Veröffentlichung
(who)
ZBW – Leibniz Information Centre for Economics
(where)
Kiel, Hamburg
(when)
2018

Handle
Last update
10.03.2025, 11:42 AM CET

Data provider

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Object type

  • Arbeitspapier

Associated

  • Vasilev, Aleksandar
  • ZBW – Leibniz Information Centre for Economics

Time of origin

  • 2018

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