Arbeitspapier
Insurance-markets Equilibrium with a Non-convex Labor Supply decision, Unobservable Effort, and Incentive ("Fair") Wages
The purpose of this note is to describe the lottery- and insurance-market equilibrium in an economy with non-convex labor supply decision, unobservable effort, and incentive ("fair") wages. The presence of indivisible labor creates a market incompleteness, which requires that an insurance market for employment be put in operation to "complete" the market.
- Language
-
Englisch
- Classification
-
Wirtschaft
Time Allocation and Labor Supply
- Subject
-
Indivisible labor
Lotteries
Insurance
Unobservable effort
fair wages
- Event
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (who)
-
Vasilev, Aleksandar
- Event
-
Veröffentlichung
- (who)
-
ZBW – Leibniz Information Centre for Economics
- (where)
-
Kiel, Hamburg
- (when)
-
2018
- Handle
- Last update
-
10.03.2025, 11:42 AM CET
Data provider
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.
Object type
- Arbeitspapier
Associated
- Vasilev, Aleksandar
- ZBW – Leibniz Information Centre for Economics
Time of origin
- 2018